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ABSTRACT 
 
Differences in income-elasticities of imports and exports among countries bring about distinct 
degrees of external constraints to growth. This argument has been pointed out by Prebisch and by 
authors  in  the  Kaldorian  tradition.  Prebisch’s  explanations  for  this  phenomenon  relate  to  the 
differences in international insertion between agrarian / peripheral and industrial / central economies. 
Kaldorian  authors, in  turn,  refer  to  Prebisch  only  to  explain  why  such  elasticities  differ  between 
products and between countries. However, even after undergoing industrialization processes, several 
economies still face external constraints to growth. The aim of this paper is to explain differences in 
trade elasticities among industrial economies. Therefore, it intends to demonstrate, by using the Neo-
Schumpeterian  literature,  the  causal  relations  between  the  development  of  a  National  Innovation 
System, the differences in income-elasticities of imports and exports, the degree of competitiveness 
and the degree of external vulnerability of an economy. 
 
Keywords: National Innovation System, Competitiveness, External Vulnerability 
 
JEL codes: O43, O40  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The works of Prebisch (2000a; 2000b), as well as the ones related to Kaldor’s (1994) growth 
theory, consider that differentials in growth rates between economies result from differences in their 
income-elasticities of imports and exports. Such differences in elasticities bring as a consequence 
dissimilar degrees of external constraint to economic growth. In an economy with a severe external 
constraint, growth would be viable in the short run through an increase in the net external liability and, 
therefore,  in  the  country’s  external  vulnerability.  However,  such  vulnerability  would  imply  low 
growth rates in the long run. 
Prebisch’s explanation for this phenomenon relate to the trade relations between agrarian and 
industrial  economies,  i.e.,  relate  to  the  differences  in  international  insertion  between  agrarian  / 
peripheral and industrial / central economies. Authors in the Kaldorian tradition, in turn, refer to 
Prebisch  only  to  explain  why  such  elasticities  differ  between  products  and  between  countries. 
However,  several  economies  still  face  external  constraints  to  growth,  even  after  undergoing 
industrialization  processes.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  present  the  reasons  for  the  existence  of 
income-elasticity differentials among industrial economies. 
Fajnzylber  (1983,  1990),  who  just  like  Prebisch  was  an  author  from  the  Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), argued that the external vulnerability of 
an agrarian economy and its severe external constraints to growth would not be surpassed by means of 
industrialization unless the latter had an “endogenous core of dynamization of technological progress”. 
According  to  Fajnzylber,  endogenous  technical  innovations  in  a  developed  and  integrated  capital 
goods  industry  are  the  key  for  competitiveness  gains  in  an  economy  and,  as  a  consequence,  for 
releasing its external restraint. Therefore, the endogenous production of technology would affect a 
country’s income-elasticity of imports and exports, leading to a release of its external constraint to 
growth. Nevertheless, Fajnzylber (1983; 1990) does not analyze this issue, i.e., he does not explain 
how the “endogenous core of technology production” affects a country’s income-elasticities of trade. 
Besides, the argument that technological progress is central for understanding competitiveness 
gains in an economy – and therefore for changes in income-elasticities of trade – is not consensual in 
the literature on this topic. In traditional trade theories, such as the Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin, the 
technological issue does not play a central role in the external equilibrium for countries under free 
trade. In this sense, Fajnzylber’s (1983; 1990) explanations for competitiveness differentials – and 
therefore for trade elasticity differentials – among industrial economies are not satisfactory. 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  explain  the  trade  elasticity  differentials  among  industrial 
economies.  It  is  intended  to  accomplish  such  task  by  demonstrating  via  the  neo-Schumpeterian 
literature the causal relations among the degree of development of the National Innovation System, the 
differences in income elasticity of trade, the degree of competitiveness and the degree of external 
vulnerability of the economy. For that, the paper contains four sections beyond this introduction. Next 
section presents the explanations and its limitations for the competitiveness and external vulnerability 
differentials between economies, given by ECLAC authors mentioned above. In section 3, Kaldor’s 
argument  is  presented,  as  well  as  other  authors  in  the  Kaldorian  tradition,  about  the  external 
constraints to growth, showing a gap in such arguments. In section 4, in order to overcome this gap,  
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the causal relations among National Innovation System, income elasticity of demand for imports and 
exports, competitiveness and external vulnerability of an economy are built. Several indicators are 
presented in this section in order to present empirical evidences on such causal relations. Last section 
brings the conclusions of this work.  
 
 
2. ECLAC AND THE EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY OF THE PERIPHERAL ECONOMY 
 
The idea of unequal development was elaborated by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  (ECLAC)  in  the  context  of  the  Center-Periphery  relationship.
  1  The 
Center-Periphery dynamics would be associated to the historical-structuralist method of analysis of 
Latin American economies, as adopted by ECLAC. The historical focus is due to the transition period 
which Latin American economies were going through when Prebish (2000a) inaugurated the agenda 
of  reflection  and  investigation  of  ECLAC.  Such  transition  corresponded  to  the  change  from  the 
primary-exports growth model, outwards, to the urban-industrial model, of growing towards inside. 
Prebisch’s structuralist theory of peripheral underdevelopment was articulated to this focus. 
The  structuralist  perspective  recognize  that  the  transition  towards  “growing  to  the  inside”  would 
happen  on  an  underdeveloped  economic  and  institutional  “structure”,  inherited  from  the  primary-
exports period. Such structure would condition economic trajectories which were unknown a priori.
2 
For  ECLAC,  there  were  structural  specificities  in  the  development  of  Latin  American 
economies associated to generation and propagation of technical progress, to productivity gains, to 
economic growth and employment, to income distribution and to competitiveness and international 
insertion. Such set of structural specificities, mutually related and conditioned, would express itself on 
the peripheral condition of Latin American economies vis-à-vis developed economies (Center), and its 
understanding would require specific theorization. 
The  Center-Periphery  dynamics  referred  to  the  structure  determining  a  specific  pattern  of 
international  insertion:  the  Periphery  producing  goods  and  services  with  not  very  dynamic 
international demand, and importing goods and services with domestic demand in rapid expansion. 
That is, in the Center the income-elasticity of demand for primary goods imports would be less than 
one, whereas the income-elasticity of demand for imports in the Periphery would be greater than one 
(Prebisch, 2000b). 
This pattern of international economic insertion would denote another peripheral specificity: a 
structural external vulnerability, which would bring about an external constraint to economic growth 
in Latin America. Such external vulnerability (and the peripheral international insertion) would occur 
via the deterioration of terms of trade between Center and Periphery over time, harming the latter. In 
this case, the international division of labor given by the relative endowments of factors of production 
would not allow the Periphery to benefit from technical progress occurring in the Center. The thesis of 
                                                 
1 Unequal development is also discussed by several non-ECLAC authors. 
2 For this reason, understanding Latin American economic development requires “studies and analyses in which economic 
theory with an universality ‘stamp’ can only be used under qualifications, in order to incorporate these historical and 
regional specificities” (Bielschowsky, 2000, p. 21, free translation).   
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deterioration in terms of trade would frontally challenge the liberal postulation about the virtues of 
free international trade.
3 
As long as productivity gains in the Center due to technical progress were not translated into 
lower prices, the Periphery would not benefit from such gains via international trade. As the same 
time, the technical progress observed in the Periphery would benefit the Center, partially or fully, 
through the reduction of prices of its exported goods in relation to the prices of goods imported from 
the Center. 
Therefore, even if the efficiency in industrial production was lower (as compared to primary 
production) in the Periphery, in the long run it would be higher than the efficiency of alternative 
allocation of productive resources in the primary sector, justifying protection to the (infant) industry. 
According to Prebisch (2000a, p. 119, free translation), “it would thus be important to check whether 
the  increase  in  industrial  production  which  is  obtained  with  the  factors  relocated  from  primary 
production would be or not (in the future) superior to the set of goods previously obtained in exchange 
for exports.” If it was superior, which would be more likely the greater the deterioration of the terms 
of trade was, productivity gains would have occurred, with gains in real income. There would be thus 
a dynamic character in the process of industrialization in the Periphery since it would result in the 
future surpassing of the levels of productivity obtained from the specialization in primary goods.
4 
The solution proposed by Prebisch would be thus the industrialization of the economies in 
Latin America, a process that would break up with their underdevelopment and with the Center-
Periphery dynamics, allowing for the overcoming of specificities common to peripheral economies. 
However, after seeing various industrialization cycles in several Latin American countries since the 
Great  Depression  in  the  1930s,  the  specificities  of  peripheral  development  were  not  overcome, 
considering  the  generation  and  diffusion  of  technology,  as  well  as  income  distribution  and  also 
reduction of the external vulnerability of these economies. 
Later on, Fajnzylber (1983 and 2000) contributed to the debate by arguing that the central 
feature of underdevelopment in Latin America is the insufficient incorporation of technical progress.
5 
According to Fajnzylber (1983), technological development is incorporated into the capital goods 
industry; i.e. the latter materially incorporates technical progress, being therefore an important channel 
of its diffusion. In addition, there would be a “virtuous cycle” between growth-technical progress 
(productivity)-international trade which has the capital goods sector as a basic causal element. 
The  capital  goods  sector  would  be  the  central  core  of  growth  determination  and 
competitiveness in the economy. According to the author, in the developed world, a competitive and 
integrated capital goods industry is an expression of a developed capacity of production of technology, 
                                                 
3 Regarding this point, see Prebisch (2000a, p. 71-72). 
4  The  dynamic  character  of  peripheral  industrialization  would  still  have  another  aspect.  Given  that  income-elasticity  of 
demand for primary imports from the Center tends to be lower than one, whereas in the Periphery the income-elasticity of 
demand for total imports is greater than one, if Latin American countries grew only due to their primary exports, as it was 
the case before 1930, their economic growth would be considerably lower than the one in industrialized countries. Thus 
there is a dynamic need for industrialization, in order for economic growth to be higher than the growth of primary exports 
without causing disequilibrium in the external sector. 
5 The “empty set” (represented by the absence of Latin American countries with per capita growth rates and, consequently, 
income distribution similar to developed countries) would be directly linked to what one would call inability to open up the 
“black box” of technical progress.  
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given that technical progress and development of the capital goods industry are related factors which 
foster each other mutually. 
Therefore, the low development of the capital goods industry in Latin American countries 
would be associated to their characteristic technological debility. Such weakness, in turn, impinge on 
the competitiveness not only of the capital goods industry itself, but also on all the manufacturing 
sector in Latin American economies, specially on their capital-intensive segments. Hence, it would 
explain the structural external deficit of Latin American economies. 
In  sum,  according  to  Fajnzylber  (1983),  the  development  of  a  “endogenous  core  of 
technological dynamization” and, thus, the development of the capital goods industry did not occur in 
Latin  America.  Therefore,  the  Latin  American  industry,  although  relatively  developed  in  some 
countries in the region, ended up being fragile, i.e. with low competitiveness. 
Fajnzylber  (1983)  understands  a  core  of  technological  dynamization  as  a  scientific-
technological  infrastructure  closely  inserted  and  related  to  the  productive  apparatus,  in  the  way 
proposed  by  the  neo-Schumpeterians.
6  According  to  the  author,  industrialization  without  the 
constitution of endogenous core of production of technology, although possible, does not lead to the 
overcoming of the peripheral specificities of an economy. On the other hand, innovations due to the 
endogenous core of technological progress increase the international competitiveness of the productive 
sector, stimulating  exports  while  reducing  its  imports  coefficient,  reducing  the  degree  of  external 
vulnerability of the economy. 
Despite the important contribution of Fajnzylber, the author is not clear about the reasons for 
the competitiveness differential that would appear between the economy specialized in technology-
intensive  goods  and  the  economy  specialized in  goods  with low  technological  intensity.  Why  do 
technological innovations increase the international competitiveness of the productive sector of an 
economy? Why do they stimulate exports while reducing the import coefficient? In Ricardo’s model 
of comparative advantages, or in Heckscher-Ohlin’s model, for instance, free trade brings about gains 
for all the participating economies. Such gains are verified in a context of external equilibrium, either 
static or intertemporal equilibrium, independently of the exports specialization of a country being 
based on technology-intensive goods or on natural resources and/or unskilled labor.
7 
In the same way, although Prebisch (2000b, p. 181-185) explained why primary products 
present lower income-elasticity of demand in comparison with the income-elasticity of demand for 
industrialized products, his solution for the overcoming of the external vulnerability of peripheral 
economies did not show to be promising. After the industrialization of Latin American economies, the 
problem with the elasticities was not eliminated (McCombie e Thirwall, 1994). In addition, the thesis 
of terms of trade deterioration is not consensual in the literature: 
                                                 
6 That is, in its constitution we would find a “large array of agents and motivations: industrial plants, technology institutes, 
basic  science  institutes,  organisms  which  prepare  qualified  personnel  at  different  levels,  and  ministries  and  central 
administration offices that define policies and norms; the creativity process occurs at the interaction between these agents 
and motivations (…), associated to the learning process, which is a determinant factor for competitiveness in the long run.” 
(Fajnzylber, 1983, p.281, free translation). 
7  The  postulate  of  the  gains  from  trade  and  financial  openess  of  the  economies  in  a  context  of  intertemporal  external 
equilibrium can be found, for instance, in Obstfeld e Rogoff (1996). A criticism to this postulate is made in Resende 
(2006).  
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“There has been some dispute in the literature whether the net barter terms of trade has moved 
consistently through history against the primary producing LDCs (less developed countries) as 
Prebisch claimed. (…) if no allowance is made for the war years, however, the terms of trade 
series look trendless.” (McCOMBIE E THIRLWALL, 1994). 
   
This questioning regarding the arguments of Prebisch and Fajnzylber will be discussed in 
section  4  of  this  paper.  Before  that,  however,  next  section  presents  the  arguments  of  Kaldor, 
McCombie  and Thirlwall for the  existence  of  differences  in  the  degree  of external  constraints  to 
growth in the economies. 
 
 
3. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT TO ECONOMIC GROWTH ACCORDING TO KALDOR, 
MCCOMBIE AND THIRLWALL 
 
Aiming to contribute with the debate on the determinants of economic growth, Kaldor (1994) 
ascribes a central role to demand in the explanation of growth rate differentials among countries, when 
increasing returns to scale are assumed.
8 The author’s focus is on the effect of net exports on the 
economy’s final demand, i.e. the increase in net exports would be fundamental to foster economic 
growth. 
In order to justify his point, Kaldor (1994) enumerates stages which the economies undergo 
until becoming fully developed.
9 At the initial stages the expansion of the domestic industrial sector 
leads the growth of the domestic market, associated with increasing consumption and, consequently, 
allowing for the appearance of increasing returns to scale. In other words, high growth rates during 
initial stages of economic development may be explained by labor migration from traditional sectors, 
where diminishing returns to scale would prevail, to the industrial sector where returns to scale would 
be increasing, allowing for growth of per capita income and of aggregate demand in the economy.
10 
Under the hypothesis of increasing returns of scale in manufacturing, this result leads to an increase in 
labor productivity and continuation of growth. The interaction between such growth of demand – 
given by the expansion of domestic market in the initial stages of the imports substitution process – 
                                                 
8  The  concept  of  increasing  returns  to  scale  originates  in  Marshall  (1982).  This  assumption  constitutes  an  important 
contribution from Kaldor to theories of economic growth. Under increasing returns to scale the productivity of the factors 
of production increases as output grows. These are results of static increasing returns. The existence of such productivity 
increases even when production is declining results from dynamic increasing returns. The presence of dynamic returns as 
described by Kaldor (1994) opens the possibility that some portion of technological progress is determined endogenously 
to the economic system. See Oliveira et all (2006). 
9  Kaldor (1994) enumerates four stages, thus described: reduction of consumption goods imports due to the expansion of 
domestic industry; growth of consumption goods net exports; reduction of capital goods imports due to the expansion of 
domestic industry; and growth of capital goods net exports.  
10 This discussion relates to the dual growth model initially developed by Lewis (1969), in which economic growth results 
from the interaction between the modern industrial sector and the backward agricultural sector. In this sector, where 
returns to scale are diminishing, there is excess supply labor. When the industrial sector grows, increasing returns to scale 
allow for the increase in manufacturing real wages, attracting labor from agriculture and increasing the average output in 
agriculture, due to the increase in productivity in the agricultural sector.  
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and the growth mechanisms proposed by Kaldor
11 may lead a country to higher and higher growth 
rates. And due to the consolidation of the domestic manufacturing sector and the equality in per capita 
income  between  the  primary  and  industrial  sectors,  net  exports  become  the  main  component  of 
demand. At this point the economic maturity of a country is achieved, when per capita real income is 
equivalent in the different sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary) of the economy (Kaldor, 1994, p. 
281). 
Kaldor’s (1994) emphasis on the evolution of net exports as the main component of final 
demand led authors such as Thirlwall (1979), McCombie e Thirlwall (1994), Dixon e Thirlwall (1994) 
to  formalize  export-led  growth  models.  The  maintenance  of  such  hypothesis  implies  the  use  of 
“Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier” (constant real terms of trade and equilibrium in the balance of 
payments), which leads to the conclusion that the growth rate of the economy is given by the ratio 
between the rate of growth of exports and the income-elasticity of demand for imports. Consequently, 
the performance of exports and imports, according to the assumptions of the model, play a decisive 
role in economic growth, as well as in the restrictions to growth, since current account deficits in the 
balance of payments may constrain growth in the economy. 
Taking these considerations into account, Thirlwall (1979) derives the balance-of-payments 
constrained  growth  rate,  known  as  Thirlwall’s  Law.  According  to  this  law,  the  growth  rate  of  a 
country cannot exceed its balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate, at least in the long run, since 
increasing  current  account  deficits  –  financed  by  capital  account  surpluses  – increase  the  risk  of 
exchange rate devaluations until a recessive adjustment becomes inevitable. Such adjustment would 
happen either spontaneously or forcefully. In addition, increasing current account deficits would lead 
to higher interest rates in order to attract capital flows, fostering the financial side of the economy and 
damaging its real side. Thus, the good functioning of these models depends on the initial assumptions 
regarding balance-of-payments equilibrium and constant real terms of trade.
12 However, the adoption 
of  several  simplifying  assumptions  in  these  models  may  preclude  their  empirical  application  to 
developing countries.
13 These restrictions to empirical application in the case of developing countries 
may at first occur due to the fact that economic maturity as defined by Kaldor (1994) has not yet been 
achieved  in  these  countries.  Therefore,  these  countries  have  not  yet  exhausted  their  capacity  to 
increase demand via the increase of domestic markets. That is, the main component of demand in 
developing  countries  is  not  net  exports  but  domestic  consumption  and  investments  due  to  the 
expansion of the industrial sector. Thus, it is possible that the hypothesis that the rate of growth of the 
economy is given by the rate of growth of exports may be (empirically) rejected. 
                                                 
11 The main characteristics of economic growth described by Kaldor are known in the literature as Kaldor Growth Laws 
(Thirlwall, 1987). They can be summarized in three propositions: the rate of growth of the economy is strongly related to 
the rate of growth of the industrial sector; the rate of growth of the industrial sector is positively related to the productivity 
of labor, and exerts a positive influence on the latter (also known as Verdoorn Law); the growth of labor productivity is 
positively associated with the growth of the industrial sector and negatively associated with the growth of the primary 
sector.  
12 By addopting Harrod’s multiplier, these models present a series of simplifying assumptions, such as the hypothesis of 
equilibrium in the Balance of Payments and the constant real terms of trade. See Thirwall (1979) and McCombie and 
Thirwall (1994) for details. 
13 See Oliveira et all (2006), McCombie and Roberts (2002) and Vieira and Holland (2006).  
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In addition, as stressed by Kaldor (1994) himself, by McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) and by 
Prebisch (2000b), the growth of developing economies tends to be accompanied by the emergence of 
external deficits. This thesis has been formulated by Prebisch (2000b). However, Kaldor points out 
that the emergence of such deficits relates to the peculiar growth process of countries in need of 
increasing  their  imports  of  capital  goods,  inputs  and  intermediary  goods,  which  are  not  supplied 
domestically due to the technological backwardness of the domestic industry. The increase in imports 
of such goods, which are necessary for the continuation of the import substitution process, makes 
economic growth dependent of the performance of the balance of payments.  
Given the inability to increase exports, growth will be accompanied by deficits in current 
account. Therefore, economic growth will be constrained if a developing country presents persistent 
external deficits. For some period of time, such deficits may be financed by the increase in the net 
external liability of the economy. However, at some point the adjustment in the Balance of Payments 
will occur, harming economic growth. 
According to McCombie and Thirlwall (1994),
14 the fact that economies export goods with 
different  elasticities  impairs  growth  with  balance-of-payment  equilibrium  in  developing  countries. 
These countries’ efforts to eliminate external deficits result in recession or inflation, amplifying the 
gap between developed and developing countries. Therefore, given the hypotheses of the model, these 
authors  conclude  that  countries  with  lower  income-elasticities  of  exports  and  higher  income-
elasticities of imports, in comparison with the rest of the world, will have lower growth rates in the 
long run. In order to reach such conclusion, the authors are based on Prebisch’s (2000b) arguments. 
In sum, according to Kaldor and the literature derived from his hypotheses, different growth 
rates among countries – particularly between developed and developing countries – may be justified 
by the tendency of a more severe external constraint to growth in the case of the latter group of 
countries,  due  to  the  characteristics  of  its  growth.  In  addition,  the  macroeconomic  adjustments 
required to lift the external constraint to growth are frequently reverted in the long run, hindering the 
sustainability of growth. A long-run strategy aiming at reducing this growth restriction would be the 
production of technological innovations in these countries, an argument which is implicit in Kaldor. 
This  brings  about  a  change  in  the  income-elasticities  of  exports  and  imports  in  the  countries, 
promoting the reduction of growth rate differentials among the economies.
15 
  However, Kaldor (1994), McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) and Dixon and Thirlwall (1994) do 
not explain the reason for differences in income-elasticities of exports and imports between countries. 
According to McCombie and Thirlwall (1994, p. 244), 
 
                                                 
14  McCombie  and  Thirlwall  (1994)  recognize  the  importance  of  income-elasticities  of  exports  and  imports  for  the 
performance of exports and imports, and build a model in order to indicate how such elasticities determine the growth rate 
of countries which are constrained by the performance of the balance-of-payments. Based on Prebisch’s arguments, the 
authors consider two countries, one developed and one developing, with different elasticities. 
15 According to Oliveira et all (2006) Kaldor’s theoretical construct does not disconsider the importance of processes of 
innovation and technological diffusion for economic growth. According to these authors, such processes were not present 
due to a methodological option made by Kaldor, who just wanted to point out to the set of relevant theoretical relations 
conditioning economic growth of countries, without giving details on the specificities of each component of growth.   
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“The deeper question lies in why the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate differs 
between  countries.  This  must  be  primarily  associated  with  the  characteristics  of  goods 
produced which determine the income elasticity of demand for the country’s exports and the 
country’s propensity to import. For countries with a slow rate of growth of exports, combined 
with a relatively high income elasticity of demand for imports, the message is plain: the goods 
produced by the country are relatively unattractive at both home and abroad (…) the argument 
probably has even greater relevance for developing countries.” 
 
  But why are there differences in the degree of attractiveness of products? In other words, why 
would the attractiveness of goods produced in developing countries be lower than the ones produced 
in developed countries? In order to answer to these questions, the authors just mention Prebisch’s 
(2000b) thesis about the income-elasticity of demand differentials. However, as we argued in the 
previous section, this thesis was built for the case of Latin America before industrialization. It only 
refers to differences in international insertion between the agrarian economy and the industrialized 
economy. Why do trade elasticities differ among industrialized economies? Next section intends to 
answer to some of the questions presented in this section and in the previous one; taking into account 
the role of technological progress for competitiveness gains and the reduction of external vulnerability 
of an economy.  
 
 
4. NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION, COMPETITIVENESS AND EXTERNAL 
VULNERABILITY 
 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the validity of the relationship between an economy’s 
National Innovation System (NIS), its competitiveness and its external vulnerability. It is argued that 
the competitiveness of an economy depends on macroeconomic policies, particularly those to do with 
the real exchange rate, domestic interest rates and the government’s fiscal balance. However, there is 
no consensus regarding the definition of the term “competitiveness of an economy” (Porter, 1990, p 
3). There are economies such as Italy, Sweden and Canada, where the real exchange rate evaluated in 
the 1990’s, but which were still considered to be competitive. Israel and The United States present 
high interest rates and fiscal deficits respectively. However, it cannot be argued that these economies 
are uncompetitive. It is also argued that competitiveness is the result of low unit labour costs and 
abundant natural resources but these factors are not characteristic of competitive economies such as 
Germany, Japan or Switzerland.  
  In this paper, an economy’s competitiveness will be defined on the basis of its ability to 
compete with the rest of the economies in the world in both the international and domestic markets. 
Thus,  the  concept  of  competitiveness  is  relative  and  involves  a  comparison  between  economies 
regarding their ability to export and satisfy internal demand by domestic production. Therefore, the 
definition of competitiveness should be related to a county’s relative capacity to generate surpluses in 
its Trade Balance 
  However, measuring an economy’s level of competitiveness is no easy task. There are a bunch 
of variables relating to the overall economic situation which influence trade balance. Amongst these  
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variables are those that depend on domestic economic policy, such as the economic growth rate, the 
real exchange rate, and policy regarding trade and subsidies, etc. There are also those variables which 
are exogenous in relation to political decision-making, such as the world economic growth rate or 
foreign partners’ trade policies. These general factors exhibit short-term fluctuations but there are also 
structural factors which only present long-term changes and which also influence trade balances, such 
as the educational level of the workforce, the rate of technological progress and productivity and the 
institutional structure of the labour market or the financial system, etc.  
  Thus, the circumstantial factors, that are dependent on the economic policies adopted, may 
lead to consecutive trade surpluses in economies with low competitiveness. The opposite may also 
occur – highly competitive economies may have consecutive trade deficits for a long period of time as 
a result of circumstantial factors which affect the trade balance. 
  Nevertheless, if a model which eliminates such circumstantial economic factors is adopted, we 
can elaborate the concept of structural competitiveness, which refers to an economy’s relative ability 
to generate trade surpluses when only structural factors are considered. According to this model, a 
very competitive economy has recurrent trade surpluses and an economy with low competitiveness has 
chronic trade deficits. So, competitive economies also tend to have Current Account surpluses in their 
Balance of Payments (CA), as long as economies with low competitiveness tend to have CA deficits.
16 
  Although, political economic decisions affect the external sector of the economy. This being 
the case, when it is sought to built an index of economic competitiveness, whose measurements are 
feasible,  the  aforementioned  general  economic  factors  must  also  be  taken  into  consideration.  An 
economy’s low competitiveness tends to lead to the occurrence of trade deficits and, consequently, to 
an increase in its foreign debt. Meanwhile, foreign credit restrictions occur on a cyclical basis and 
force uncompetitive economies to adopt policies to regulate its external sector.
17 In this case, trade 
surpluses are often generated by the contraction of economic activity and devaluation of the real 
exchange rate, with the aim of balancing the CA account in uncompetitive economies. In the very 
competitive economies, on the other hand, the tendency to generate high trade surpluses may lead to 
the adoption of macroeconomic policies which cause deterioration in the trade balance. However, 
since these economies tend to be creditors in the international scenario, their CA balances tend to be 
higher than their trade balances, and, as a result the CA balance seems to reflect more accurately the 
competitive level of an economy than the trade balance. This means that the circumstantial factors that 
oscillate  in  the  short-term  have  a  greater  influence  on  trade  balances  than  on  CA  balances.  CA 
balances are therefore a more accurate reflection of the influence of structural factors, which are stable 
in the short-term, than trade balances. 
  Therefore,  the  competitiveness  is  defined  as  its  relative  capacity  to  generate  surpluses  in 
Current Account. Thus, the size of the average CA balance over a fixed period of time is taken as the 
                                                 
16 This happens because financing of trade deficits is usually carried out by means of surpluses in the Financial Account of 
the Balance of Payments, which increases the economy’s external debt and contributes to future negative balances in the 
CA. In the case where economies have consecutive trade surpluses, they can be used to finance CA deficits in other 
countries and help to produce future CA surpluses in the creditor country. 
17 This argument will be explained later on and is compatible with the literature which employs the hypothesis of balance of 
payments constrained economic growth, à la Thirlwall and CEPAL.  
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index of an economy’s competitiveness.
18 This index is not valid only for economies which are the 
centre of the international financial system. The net capital inflows via the Financial Account of the 
Balance of Payments in the country where the main international financial market is located tends to 
be high and persistent and brings about economic policies that are associated with the occurrence of 
chronic CA deficits viable, even when the economy is competitive. This seems to be the case of the 
United States and the United Kingdom during the last few decades. 
  Once defined the concept of competitiveness and the method of calculating the level of an 
economy’s competitiveness, we now intend to analyse the effects of structural factors on the level of 
competitiveness and the channels by which they transmit their influence to it. The emphasis will be on 
the ones associated with technological progress. 
  An economy’s level of competitiveness depends primarily on its export-import performance in 
the period under analysis. Initially, therefore, the relationship between technical progress and exports 
will be explained. In this regard, the value of an economy’s exports depends on three characteristics of 
the markets of the products exported, namely:  
 
i)  Market Structure of the export industries: The closer the exports to oligopoly or monopoly, the 
greater the ability of the exporting company to fix the prices of its products, and, therefore, the 
higher the profitability and value of its exports tends to be.  
ii)  Dynamism of the market: The higher the rate of growth in demand in the market, the greater the 
value of exports to that market tends to be.  
iii) Level of market protectionism: The less the market is subject to protectionist policies, the greater 
tends to be the value of exports to that market. 
In addition to being influenced by these three features of a market, the value of exports also 
depends on a fourth factor: 
iv) Diversification of the economy’s industrial structure. 
 
  The three aforementioned characteristics of a market affect the value of exports. We argue that 
in international trade, the greater the level of technological sophistication of products, the closer the 
structures of their markets resemble oligopoly or monopoly, the more dynamic are their markets and 
the less they are subject to protectionist measures. Technological progress and its diffusion in an 
economy occur in the context of the development of that economy’s NIS (Freeman, 2004; Nelson, 
2005; Fagerberg, 1994; Bernardes e Albuquerque, 2003). Therefore, the development of an economy’s 
NIS affects the level of technological sophistication of its production and this, in turn, affects its 
exports. 
   The positive correlation between the level of technological sophistication of products and the 
degree of oligopoly is due to the fact that a product that is in the technology frontier, or close to it, 
cannot be produced in countries which do not possess a developed NIS. Production cannot just simply 
                                                 
18 In addition, the greater the period of time used for calculation of the average CA surplus, the less intense the effects of the 
oscillations in the overall economic factors affecting the trade and CA balance will be.  
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be transferred to other countries, given that few economies possess an NIS that is developed enough to 
enable them to manufacture such products. That implies no heavy competition for these products in 
world markets and makes possible a tacit or explicit agreements concerning price fixing for the goods 
in the international market. This situation favors an increase of the income elasticity of demand for the 
country’s exports. 
  The positive correlation between the level of technological sophistication of products and the 
level of dynamism of its markets is due to the fact that a product which is in the technology frontier, or 
close to it, cannot be produced in a country which does not have a developed NIS. In this case, the 
demand for such a product can only be satisfied by means of imports from the few countries where the 
NIS is able to produce it, thus guaranteeing a world-wide market with increasing (dynamic) demand 
for this type of leading edge technology product. The higher the dynamism of the country’s exports 
markets, the higher the income elasticity of demand for this country’s exports tends to be. 
The  inverse  correlation  between  a  product’s  level  of  technological  sophistication  and  the 
degree of protectionism in its domestic market is due to the fact that a product made by low level of 
technological content can be produced by many countries, even if the production costs are high in 
comparison to the world average. Domestic production is made viable by erecting tariff and non-tariff 
barriers  to  importation  of  this  type  of  product  as  in  the  case,  for  example,  of  a  wide  variety  of 
agricultural products from many European countries. However, if the technological content of the 
product is of a high level, it cannot immediately be produced after tariff barriers have been established 
if the country’s NIS is not sufficiently developed to make it possible. In such cases, the domestic 
demand  for  the  product  can  only  be  satisfied  by  imports  and  this  would  imply  a  low  level  of 
protectionism (in the domestic markets of a wide range of countries) and a high level of the income 
elasticity of export demand for high technology products. 
  As regards the diversification of an economy’s industrial structure, the more developed its 
NIS, the greater is the possibility of reaching the technological frontline in various areas of production, 
that  is  to  say,  the  technological  “opportunities”  are  greater.  Therefore,  the  greater  the  degree  of 
diversification of the industrial structure tends to be. Consequently, there is greater diversification in 
the range of its export goods, which favours growth in the value of exports, due to at least three 
factors, namely, i) domination of new markets that will be even more diversified to the extent that the 
range of exports becomes even more diversified; ii) stability of growth in the value of exports, since, 
the more diversified exports are, the greater the chance that a drop in price and/or demand for exports 
will be compensated by an increase in the price and/or demand of another product in the range of 
exports; iii) increase in the income elasticity of the demand for exports. In such a situation, the export 
opportunities will be greater to the extent that there is greater diversification of the range of export 
goods.  
Therefore,  the  four  items  examined  –  level  of  oligopoly,  market  dynamism,  level  of 
protectionism and diversification of the industrial structure – suggest that the  more developed an 
economy’s NIS, the greater its export coefficient and the value of its exports should be. Thus, the level 
of development of the NIS is positively correlated with the performance of the trade balance and the 
Current Account balance.  
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The  relationship  between  the  level  of  a  country’s  NIS  development  and  imports  is  also 
associated with the four items previously singled out in the case of exports. The more the structure of a 
market resembles oligopoly, the higher the prices are in this market and, as argued, there is a positive 
correlation between the level of technological sophistication of products and degree of oligopoly in 
this market. As a result, countries with a low level of NIS development are not capable of producing 
goods with high technology content and import such goods from high priced markets where there is 
oligopoly. In addition to this, the more dynamic a market for a particular good, the greater will be the 
demand in this market, thus favouring an increase in prices and making its imports more expensive – 
the positive correlation between level of technological sophistication of products and the degree of 
market dynamism has already been explained. Also, the lower the tariff and non-tariff barriers for 
certain products, the greater tends to be the value of imports of these goods. As already argued, there 
is an inverse correlation between the degree of a product’s technological sophistication and the level 
of protectionism in its domestic markets. 
Finally, the less developed the NIS, the less diversified an economy’s industrial structure 
tends to be. Therefore, the more diversified its range of imports and the greater the proportion of 
internal demand that will be satisfied by means of imports. This leads to growth in both the income 
elasticity of import demand and the value of imports.  
Therefore, in a country where the NIS is relatively less developed, the income elasticity of 
export demand tends to be lower than the income elasticity of demand for imports, leading to external 
structural vulnerability, as postulated initially by ECLAC-UN and Thirlwall. 
It may be concluded that the more developed an economy’s NIS, the greater will be the range 
of its products which are at the leading edge of international technology, or close to it, and that this 
will cause an increase in the value of exports and reduce the value of imports. The opposite situation is 
true in countries with an underdeveloped NIS. Therefore, countries with a developed NIS tend to have 
a high level of competitiveness and countries where the level of development of the NIS is below the 
world average tend to have a lower level of competitiveness.  
The level of development of a country’s NIS can be measured on the basis of that country’s 
per  capita  production  of  patents  compared  to the  per  capita  production in the  world  as  a  whole. 
According to Bernardes and Albuquerque (2003, p. 873) and Albuquerque (1999), patents are not an 
infallible  means  of  measuring  the  level  of  technological  development  but,  nevertheless,  it  is  the 
method used in the literature and is useful in achieving this objective. Using data relating to science 
and technology indicators, Albuquerque (1999) concluded that the countries which have a developed 
NIS are: Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Israel. Countries 
which are at the stage of catching up, that is, where the NIS is close to the developed level are: South 
Korea,  Taiwan  and  Singapore.  All  the  other  countries  are  in  the  category  of  Undeveloped  NIS 
(Immature National Innovation System).  
Therefore, in this article Albuquerque’s (1999) classification was used to collect data on the 
international trade of two groups of countries: countries with a developed NIS (DIS) and those with an 
undeveloped  NIS  (UDIS).  The  following  countries  were  selected  to  represent  the  DIS  group:-  
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Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Canada
19 and for the UDIS 16 countries from Latin America, Asia 
and  Africa  were  chosen:-  Brazil,  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Colombia,  Chile,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, The Philippines and South Africa. 
Table 1 shows the CA balance for the DIS and UDIS groups. An economy’s average CA 
balance in any specific period is an indicator of its competitiveness during that period. For the period 
between  1966  and  2006  when  data  was  available,  the  DIS  group  had  an  average  CA  surplus  of 
US$68.2 billion and the UDIS group had an average deficit of US$16.4 billion. These figures are 





Total and Average Current Account Balance, 1966 – 2005 (US$ billion) 
 
  Sum of CA balances in the 
period: 1966-2006 
Average in the Period: 
1966-2006  Standard Deviation 
DIS  2.548  63,7  78,4 
UDIS  -690  -17,3  30,4 
Source: Author’s elaboration using data from World Development Indicators database, 2007. 
DIS = countries with a developed NIS – G7 countries excluding USA and UK were taken as proxy; 
UDIS = countries with an undeveloped NIS – were taken as Proxy: Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Philippines and South Africa. 
 
 
The  products  that  are  at  the  leading  edge  of  technology,  or  close  to  it,  are  capital  and 
manufactured goods in general. The former materially incorporate technological progress (Faynzylber, 
1983), and the latter require more complex production processes and more aggregate value compared 
to primary and intermediate goods.
20 Thus, the higher the level of development of an economy’s NIS, 
the  higher  the  level  of  technological  progress  attained  by  that  country  and  the  more  developed, 
integrated and competitive its capital goods industry is. In the same way, since the manufacturing 
sector incorporates a greater amount of technological content in comparison with other sectors, the 
greater the level of development of a country’s NIS, the more diversified and competitive its output of 
manufactured goods will be. Therefore, if the level of development of a country’s NIS is a relevant 
factor in determining the level of competitiveness of its economy, then countries which have a more 
developed  NIS  should  have  a  capital  goods  and  manufactured  goods  trade  balance  which  has  a 
tendency to be in surplus, whereas those countries which have a less developed NIS should have a 
trade balance which tends to be in deficit. Given this result, one would expect capital goods and 
manufacturing goods exports from countries with a developed NIS to present high shares in world 
exports, in comparison with countries with an undeveloped NIS. 
                                                 
19 The exclusion of this group of two countries that are important in the world scenario, the Unites States and the United 
Kingdom, was justified above. 
20 Technological progress is linked to the capital goods industry, since the latter materially incorporates the former and is an 
important  channel  for  its  diffusion.  This  type  of  industry  is  a  crucial  determinant  of  an  economy’s  growth  and 
competitiveness and acts as the basic link in the “virtuous circle” of growth – technological progress – international trade 
(Fajnzylber, 1983, p. 36). According to (Fajnzylber, 1983, p. 42), there is a structural trade deficit in developing countries, 
since their capital goods industry has a low level of technological complexity and integration.  
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Table  2  shows  the  average  balance  of  the  total  trade  balance  in  capital  goods  (CG), 
manufactured goods (MG) and primary goods (PG) for the DIS and UDIS groups of countries between 
1980 and 2005. The different results obtained by these two groups show the importance of the level of 
development of an economy’s NIS as regards the increase of competitiveness of an economy. In both, 
the trade balance average was in surplus but was much higher for the DIS group than for the UDIS 
group. In the case of the UDIS group the average CG and MG balance was in deficit, while the 




Total Trade Balance in Capital Goods, Manufactured Goods and Primary Goods - 1980 to 2005 (US$ 
billion) 
 
Period  UDIS  DIS 
1980-2005  TTB  CGTB*  MTB  PTB  TTB  CGTB*  MTB  PTB 
Average  14  -42.5  -55.1  38.2  146.9  137.4  337  -58.6 
Source: Author’s elaboration using data from United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, 2007. 
DIS = countries with a developed NIS – G7 countries excluding USA and UK were taken as proxy; 
UDIS = countries with an undeveloped NIS – were taken as Proxy: Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Philippines and South Africa.  
TTB = total trade balance; CGTB = capital goods trade balance; MTB = manufactured goods trade balance; PTB = primary 
goods trade balance. 
*For CGTB data is available only for 1995 and for the period 1998-2005. 
 
 
Table 3 presents the percentage share of total exports (goods), capital goods, manufactured 
goods and primary goods in total world exports and by type of good, during the period 1980-2005. 
Overall  exports  from  the  DIS  group  represent  a  significant  share  of  world  exports.  This  group 
dominates almost 50% of total world exports, 57% of world exports of manufactured goods, and 
51.9% of capital goods world exports. Exports from the UDIS group represent only 8.73% of total 
world exports. Furthermore it is responsible for 6.2% of world exports of manufactured goods and 
8.8% of world exports of capital goods. For countries in the UDIS group, primary goods represent the 
largest share in world exports (16.4%), whereas this type of goods is the one with the lowest share in 
world exports from the DIS group (38.4%). 
Therefore, in all the categories described here, the share in world exports from countries in the 
DIS group is always larger than the share from countries in the UDIS group. Even more, this gap is 
much larger for manufactured and capital goods, as compared to primary goods. 
The large difference between the percentages of exports from the groups DIS and UDIS in 
world trade, especially for technology-intensive goods, associated with the results regarding trade 
balance and current account balance, show a non-competitive international insertion for countries in 
the UDIS group and a competitive external insertion for economies in the DIS group. 
In the same way, when analyzing foreign trade from DIS and UDIS  groups according to 
factor- and technology-intensity, it is expected that the trade balance in technology-intensive goods 
will be in surplus in countries where the NIS is more developed. The opposite should be the case in 
countries with a relatively less developed NIS. Table 4 presents the average trade balance in primary 
commodities,  labor-  intensive  and  natural-resource-intensive  goods,  as  well  as  goods  with  high,  
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medium and low technological level between 1980 and 2004.
21 The average trade balance for the 
UDIS group was in deficit for high, medium and low technology  goods and in surplus for basic 
commodities and labour-intensive and natural-resource-intensive goods, while the result was exactly 






















Source: Author’s elaboration using data from United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, 2007. 
SIM = DIS = countries with a developed NIS – G7 countries excluding USA and UK were taken as proxy; 
SINM = UDIS = countries with an undeveloped NIS – were taken as Proxy: Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Philippines and South Africa. 
TG = total exports of goods; CG = capital goods; MG = manufactured goods; PG = primary goods. 




Trade balance in primary commodities, labor-intensive and natural-resource-intensive goods, and 
goods with high, medium and low technological intensity (US$ billion) 
 
Period  UDIS  DIS 
1980-2004  PC  LNRI  HT  MT  LT  PC  LNRI  HT  MT  LT 
Average  51.0  22.8  -24.8  -42.1  -7.8  -79.2  -4.7  56.4  218.6  42.3 
Source: Author’s elaboration using data from United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, 2007. 
DIS = countries with a developed NIS – G7 countries excluding USA and UK were taken as proxy; 
UDIS = countries with an undeveloped NIS – were taken as Proxy: Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Philippines and South Africa. 
PC = primary commodities; LNRI = labor- and natural-resource-intensive goods; HT, MT and LT are, respectively, goods with 
high, medium and low technological intensity. 
 
 
These results can still be explained by the low share of technology-intensive goods in the 
exports from the UDIS goods, which is quite lower than the share for countries in the DIS group, 
characterized by larger export shares of goods with higher technological intensity. The largest share in 
                                                 
21 This classification was made by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2002).  
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total  exports  from  the  UDIS  group  (table  5)  is  primary  commodities  (42.54%  of  total  exports), 
followed by exports of goods with high technological intensity (20.71%). In the DIS group, exports of 
goods  with  high  and  medium  technological  intensity  represent  around  30.38%  and  37.26%, 
respectively, whereas export share of commodities in total exports from this group is only 14.35%. 
Exports of high and medium technological intensity altogether represent a little over than 30% 
of total exports from the UDIS group, against almost 70% of exports share of these goods in total 
exports from the DIS group. Table 6 complements the argument by showing strict dominance of 
countries from the DIS group in world exports of products with higher technological intensity, as 
compared to the UDIS group. Such difference is smaller in the case of primary commodities and 




Export Composition by Factor Intensity - 1980-2004 - (%) 
 
Period  UDIS  DIS 
1980-2004  PC  LNRI  HT  MT  LT  Total  PC  LNRI  HT  MT  LT  Total 
Average  42.54  16.36  20.71  14.20  6.20  100.0  14.35  9.80  30.38  37.26  8.20  100.0 
Source: Author’s elaboration using data from United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, 2007. 
DIS = countries with a developed NIS – G7 countries excluding USA and UK were taken as proxy; 
UDIS = countries with an undeveloped NIS – were taken as Proxy: Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Philippines and South Africa. 
PC = primary commodities; LNRI = labor- and natural-resource-intensive goods; HT, MT and LT are, respectively, goods with 

























Source: Author’s elaboration using data from United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, 2007. 
SIM = DIS = countries with a developed NIS – G7 countries excluding USA and UK were taken as proxy; 
SINM = UDIS = countries with an undeveloped NIS – were taken as Proxy: Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Philippines and South Africa. 
PC = primary commodities; LNRI = labor- and natural-resource-intensive goods; HT, MT and LT are, respectively, goods with 
high, medium and low technological intensity. 
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The argument that technological innovation plays an important role in the external insertion of 
the economies is corroborated by the correlation coefficient between the share of each of the 23 
countries of both UDIS and DIS groups (including USA and UK) in the world per capita production of 
patents and the share of each country in world exports of goods with high technological intensity 
(table 7). These coefficients are high and positive, showing an average of 0.95 for all the periods 
analyzed, and suggesting a high correlation between the level of development of the NIS in a country 
and its performance in exports of high technology goods. 
Last of all, Table 8 shows the coefficients of correlation between the CA balance and the share 
in the world per capita production of patents in the 21 countries which make up the DIS and UDIS 
groups. The correlations are high and positive: 0.84 and 0.86 for the periods 1980-2005 and 1990-
2005  respectively  and  confirm  the  importance  of  the  relevant  level  of  NIS  development  for  the 




Correlation Coefficient between the share of each country in world production of per capita patents and 
the share of each country in world exports of high technology goods – sample of 23 countries 
 
Period  1980  1985  1990  1995  2004  1980-2004  1990-2004 
Correlation coefficient  0.95  0.96  0.96  0.95  0.93  0.94  0.93 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The 23 countries are: Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, USA, UK, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, 





Correlation Coefficient between Current Account Balance and the share of 21 countries in the per capita 
world production of patents 
 
Period  1970-2005  1980-2005  1990-2005 
Correlation coefficient  0.74  0.71  0.68 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The 21 countries are: Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, 




All these results endorse the argument that the relative level of development of an economy’s 
NIS  is  an  important  determinant  of  its  level  of  competitiveness.  Countries  with  a  more  (less) 
developed  NIS  have  a  higher  (lower)  level  of  competitiveness.  Given  that  the  concept  of 
competitiveness  refers  to  an  economy’s  capacity  to  generate  CA  surpluses,  economies  with  a 
developed NIS tend to have a relative abundance of foreign exchange, whereas in countries with a less 
developed NIS there is a chronic shortage of foreign exchange. 
If we define an economy’s level of external vulnerability as the frequency with which it runs 
out of foreign exchange, we find that there is a high level of external vulnerability in countries where 
there  is  an  undeveloped  IS.  By  the  same  token,  there  is  a  low  level  of  external  vulnerability  in 
countries  with  a  developed  IS.  Therefore,  there  is  a  positive  correlation  between  the  level  of 
development of an economy’s IS and its level of competitiveness and a negative correlation between  
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its level of competitiveness and level of external vulnerability. Thus, other things being equal, the 
more  developed  an  economy’s  NIS  compared  to  that  of  other  economies,  the  lower  the  level  of 
external vulnerability will be. 
The  shortage  of  foreign  exchange  in  an  economy  frequently  causes  a  currency  crisis. 
Therefore, economies which have recurring exchange rate crises are precisely the ones which have a 
high level of external vulnerability. The inverse relationship between level of IS development and 
level  of  external  vulnerability  is  backed  up  by  empirical  evidence.  The  economic  history  of  the 
countries belonging to the UDIS group reveals a proportionately higher number of currency crises than 
that observed for the DIS group. The series of currency crises seen in the period from 1990 to 2006, 
for example, whose result was exchange rate devaluations that, in a matter of weeks, exceeded the 
30% level, only happened in UDIS countries – in Mexico in 1994-95, in Asia in 1997, in Russia in 





  Authors from ECLAC, such as Prebisch and Fajnzylber, and from the Kaldorian tradition, like 
Thirlwall and McCombie, converge to the same explanation regarding the differences in economic 
growth  rates  among  countries.  These  differences  would  derive  from  different  levels  of  external 
constraint to growth of the economies. The external constraint to growth, in turn, would depend on the 
country’s income-elasticities of imports and exports. 
  However, Prebisch’s (2000a; 2000b) explanations for differences in trade elasticities among 
countries  are  not  adequate  when  all  countries  are  industrialized.  In  addition,  his  thesis  on  the 
deterioration of terms of trade is not consensual in the literature. The arguments by McCombie and 
Thirlwall (1994) are also insufficient, since they only refer to Prebisch in order to explain why those 
elasticities differ among goods and among countries. 
  For Fajnzylber (1983; 1990), the industrialization of an economy, when accompanied by the 
constitution of an “endogenous core of technology production”, would affect its competitiveness and 
its trade balance, relaxing its external constraint to growth. That would only be possible, thus, if the 
constitution of this “endogenous core of technology production” modified the income-elasticities of 
trade in the economy. However, Fajnzylber does not analyze this issue, i.e. he does not explain how 
the “endogenous core of technology generation” of an economy would affect its income-elasticities of 
imports and exports. 
  In order to fill this gap, this paper built causal links between the development of a National 
Innovation System, changes in income-elasticities of trade, competitiveness and external vulnerability 
of an economy. For that, we initially discussed the concept of competitiveness of an economy and how 
to measure it. Afterwards, the correlations between relative development of the national innovation 
system, income-elasticities of trade, competitiveness and external vulnerability of an economy were 
theoretically demonstrated. Finally, the theoretical arguments were supported empirically through the 
construction of several indicators. We found that countries where the national innovation system is 
more developed dominate world trade and present structurally positive external balances. The opposite 
is the case for countries where the national innovation system is less developed.  
  24
  The empirical  evidence  presented  in  this  paper  corroborate  the  argument  that  the  relative 
development  of  the  national  innovation  system  in  an  economy  is  relevant  to  explain  its 
competitiveness,  its  degree  of external  vulnerability  and  the intensity  of its  external  constraint to 
growth.  In  this  sense,  it  reaffirms  the  importance  of  stimulating  the  development  of  the  national 
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